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Robert Boyer, Michel Freyssenet* 
A New Approach of Productive Models. 
The World that Changed the Machine** 
Once again, and over a ten-year span, the worldwide automobile industrial 
environment has changed. At the start of 1990’s, American and European carmakers 
seemed to be forced rapidly to adopt the Japanese system of lean production that included 
the active participation by workers and suppliers in achieving performance improvement 
objectives. And yet, a short decade later, this quasi-unanimous conviction of the superiority 
of the new production model seems to have lost its zest. How can one account for the 
economic crisis in Japan, where firms such as Nissan, Mazda, and Mitsubishi were required 
at the end of the 1990s to seek out capitalistic alliances or become totally absorbed in order 
to avoid bankruptcy? How can one account for Toyota and Honda’s diminished expansion 
while simultaneously American and European firms are recovering to the point of leading 
the acquisitions-mergers-alliance dance throughout the world? These questions have been 
tackled by GERPISA, an international research network of sociologists and economists, 
pinpointing profound dependencies between production models and national institutions or 
„regulations”.  
Neue Produktionsmodelle. Von der Welt, welche die Maschine veränderte 
Im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich die Welt der Automobilindustrie wieder einmal stark 
verändert. Zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre schienen amerikanische und europäische 
Automobilproduzenten keine Wahl zu haben, das japanische System der schlanken 
Produktion zu übernehmen, in dem auch die Arbeitnehmer und Zulieferer zu 
kontinuierlichen Verbesserungen angehalten waren. Doch heute scheint die Begeisterung 
für das japanische Produktionsmodell verschwunden. Wie ist die ökonomische Krise Japans 
zu erklären, in der es für Unternehmen wie Nissan, Mazda und Mitsubishi Ende der 
neunziger Jahre nötig wurde, strategische Allianzen einzugehen, oder aufgekauft zu werden, 
wenn nicht bankrott zu gehen? Wie ist zu verstehen, dass Toyota und Honda so viel 
schwächer expandieren, während gleichzeitig gut erholte europäische und amerikanische 
Automobilproduzenten den weltweiten Reigen von Aufkäufen, Fusionen und Allianzen 
anführen? Die hier entwickelten Antworten beruhen auf den Analysen des internationalen 
Forschungsverbundes GERPISA, in dem Ökonomen und Soziologen der Abhängigkeit 
erfolgreicher Produktionspolitiken von nationalen Institutionen oder „Regulationen“ 
nachspüren. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
*  Robert Boyer, economist, Research Director CNRS, CEPREMAP, Studies Director EHESS, 
Paris.  
 Michel Freyssenet, sociologist, Research Director CNRS (IRESCO-CSU) Paris, GERPISA 
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A System that Failed to Prevent the Japanese Crisis 
And yet, a short decade later, this quasi-unanimous conviction seems to have 
lost its zest. How come the system that was going to change the world was not able to 
prevent the country that gave birth to it from plunging into a long period of economic 
crisis, a period not yet over? How come firms such as Nissan, Mazda, and Mitsubishi, 
considered up to now as representative of the Japanese production model as well as 
other firms, were required at the end of the 1990s to seek out coroporate alliances or 
become totally absorbed in order to avoid bankruptcy? How can one account for 
Toyota and Honda’s diminished expansion while simultaneously American and 
European firms are recovering to the point of leading the acquisitions-mergers-
alliance dance throughout the world? 
Drunk with their success, did Japanese firms neglect the principles of the model 
they had invented? In adopting the Japanese model, did American and European 
firms perform better than their „master“? Is lean production none other than a step 
towards a new model combining a certain number of its elements with the principles 
of modular production that carmakers, especially European ones, were the first to 
implement? 
Turned more pragmatic, the firms’ managers admit today that they are seeking 
to adopt and apply the best practices of their competitors no matter what they are. 
Will this less dogmatic approach, correctly recognizing that nothing is definitive, 
allow firms to achieve long lasting competitiveness? Does it suffice to simply add up 
the best practices in order to achieve high performance levels? 
GERPISA believes that it can respond to all of these questions with new insight, 
one based on a more rigorous scientific and practical foundation thanks to research 
projects carried out by its members during the 1990s. In 1992, social science 
researchers who established the international GERIPSA group (Groupe d’Etudes et 
de Recherche Permanent sur l’Industrie et les Salariés de l’Automobile/The 
Permanent Research Group on the Automobile Industry and Workers) expressed their 
ambivalence with MIT’s hypothesis. Some of them questioned the characterization of 
lean production and its possible adoption without important local adaptation 
measures, all the while recognising its general relevance. The others simply rejected 
the idea that a universal one best way could even exist. These doubts were fed by a 
number of observations.  
Some Japanese GERPISA members underlined that important differences 
existed between firms in Japan as in any country, and thus it was dangerous to 
generalize. They also impressed upon other GERPISA members, unaware of certain 
facts, that a firm as emblematic as Toyota had experienced an important labor crisis 
in 1990 and had been obliged to implement substantial transformations in its 
production system.  
Economist members of GERPISA outlined the particularly restrictive conditions 
required for a global homogenization of markets, and consequently insisted on the 
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probability that at least a minimum of several variants on the model would emerge. 
Historians recalled the failed attempts to transplant the Ford system outside the 
United States during the interwar period, and the superior profitability of local 
carmakers, thus suggesting that a model has conditions for feasibility that limit its 
diffusion. Sociologists questioned whether lean production could inaugurate a long-
lasting inversion of the division of labor between conception and execution, and/or 
radically change the content of work. All noted that essential methodological rules 
had not been respected in comparisons made between firms. Hence, a formally 
identical component of organization, such as teamwork, can in fact fulfill different 
functions and target a variety of objectives in the firm. Consequently, this prevented 
one from concluding that lean production, meant to be represented by teamwork, 
could be easily diffused. In short, GERPISA members considered that the plurality of 
models was as much a plausible hypothesis deserving testing as that of the diffusion 
of a unique model as being solely capable of guaranteeing a firm’s profitability. 
This is why the international research program entitled „Emergence of New 
Industrial Models“ was launched. It was rapidly followed by a second international 
research program, „The Automobile Industry: Between Globalization and 
Regionalization“, which served as the complement to and expansion of the first 
program. What ensued was a long process of identifying successive problems that 
principal automobile firms, and a certain number of their foreign subsidiaries, had 
encountered since the end of the 1960s, both in the market and labor fields, as well as 
solutions they had attempted to implement to solve these problems. This became the 
means by which analyses of shared or different conditions leading towards 
profitability could be carried out, as well as improved understanding of the meaning 
attributed to changes underway, be it in the field of product policy, productive 
organization, and/or employment relationships (Boyer, Freyssenet, Lung, 1999). 
The main and commonly shared conclusion of this international research project 
underlines the renewed and long lasting diversity of macro-economic and societal 
conditions in which firms evolve, and the variety in their strategic choices and 
production systems despite a certain number of apparent or transitory convergences. 
This contextual, strategic, and socio-productive diversity does not necessarily 
render each firm unique unto itself, thus rejecting the idea of a general model. On the 
contrary, it is characterized by processes that enabled certain firms to adopt or invent 
a coherent and pertinent production system, but also by developments that prevented 
other carmakers from achieving lasting profitability, due to both internal and external 
reasons leading to one crisis after another. 
At the end of the first research program, scientific coordinators Robert Boyer 
and Michel Freyssenet pursued this analysis and extended the research to cover 
earlier periods of the automobile industry, other carmakers, and numerous host 
countries for transplants. The objective was to provide a clear characterization of 
previously existing productive models, to conceptualize conditions for their 
emergence, crisis, and disappearance, and from a more extensive standpoint, to be 
capable of enumerating conditions for their profitability. The analyical framework 
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thus obtained was tested and developed during the second international research 
program, under the scientific direction of Michel Freyssenet and Yannick Lung, the 
goal being to improve understanding of the new internationalization processes 
implemented by firms in the automobile industry during the second half of the 1990s. 
What follows are the results both from of the first and the second international 
GERPISA reserch programs. 
 A Single Productive Model Has Never Existed 
The „received wisdom“ of the history of the automobile industry divided up into 
three phases has become common to those who study it and those who work in it. 
Following a primarily „craft“- based phase that corresponded to elitist demand, 
carmakers are said to have adopted the mass production system, which – thanks to 
obtained economies of scale – allowed the market to be extended to the population at 
large. Because of this system’s inherent rigidity, it is said to have been thrown into 
crisis by the transition to a more variable, renewed, and diversified demand as well as 
to a far too competitive and global market. Lean production was meant to be the 
model adapted to this new configuration. However, the three supposedly successive 
systems are actually the result of historic amalgams and conceptual ambiguities.  
From the start of the 20th century, automobile firms were industrial enterprises 
using tool-machines and interchangeable parts even if they assembled their vehicles 
on a fixed station or on non-mechanized short assembly lines (Laux, J. 1977). These 
did not disappear in the United States because of a lack of competitiveness with 
„mass producers“, but rather due to a lack of liquid assets following the Great 
Depression (Dan Raff, 1998). Elsewhere, not only were they maintained and even 
developed, but they also competed efficiently with Ford’s subsidiaries that, in the 
absence of mass consumption, could not be profitable in the long run. Contrary to 
Ford, and through supply diversity and production flexibility, they were able to 
answer in a profitable manner to limited and diversified markets. Several productive 
models were elaborated to achieve this. At least two have been identified and 
characterized: the „Woollardian model“ and the „Taylorian model“. The latter was 
not in fact itself conceived for „mass production“, contrary to many beliefs (Tolliday, 
1998). 
Thus the „mass production“ model – erroneously called „Taylorian-Fordian“ – 
in fact mixes two models, the „Fordian“ and the „Sloanian“ models, whose conditions 
for viability as well as specific characteristics are different despite the fact that they 
share the principle of the mechanized assembly line amongst themselves and with 
others. The „Fordian model“ implemented a volume strategy by mass producing a 
standard vehicle whereas the „Sloanian“ model implemented both a volume and 
diversity strategy by diversifying its models „on the surface“ through body, saddlery, 
and equipment, and by commonalizing the invisible parts and platforms. While the 
first model experienced a transitory and geographically limited existence, the second 
appeared from the 1950s on to have become the universal model, given the 
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development of a finely hierarchized demand ranging from bottom-of-the-line to top-
of-the-line products. Indeed, a decidedly visible convergence was observed.  
However, the diffusion of the „Sloanian model“ was slowed down, first by the 
labor crisis at the end of the 1960s, and then by the monetary and oil crises spanning 
1971 to 1974. These crises even seemed to strip away any viability whatsoever of the 
„Sloanian model“. In fact, it met some difficulties in the United States during the 
1960s, paradoxically due to its success at the very moment when it was being 
celebrated as the one best way for the second half of the 20th century. In addition, it 
had not been as widely adopted as managerial discourse, and hasty conclusions, had 
reported at the time. Indeed, it had been adopted only by a certain number of firms in 
only a few industrialized countries where national income distribution was carried out 
in a coordinated and moderately inegalitarian manner (Freyssenet, Mair, Smimzu, 
Volpato, 1998).  
Two new industrial models were simultaneously being developed in the 
Japanese automobile industry: the „Toyotan model“ privileging „permanent reduction 
of costs at constant volume“, and the „Hondian model“ implementing a totally 
different profit strategy of „innovation and flexibility“. These two models were 
erroneously placed under the same heading of lean production despite the fact that 
they differ significantly on essential points. The remarkable performances of the 
firms which embodied these models (Toyotan and Hondian) did not chase however 
the „Sloanian model“ away. Volkswagen adopted it as of 1974, and was able to 
exploit it profitably in the context of a renewed market. These three firms Toyota, 
Honda, and Volkswagen were in fact the only ones to have a „break-even point“ that 
was constantly and significantly above their value added, whereas all other carmakers 
had experienced periods of non-profitability (Boyer, Freyssenet, forthcoming). 
It is not the intrinsic and non-temporal qualities of their productive models that 
achieved the performance levels of these three firms. The first reason for their 
profitability was the adaptation of their profit strategies to their country’s „national 
income distribution and growth system“ that the international context favored after 
1974. Floating exchange rates and oil crises, by cutting back on worldwide growth, 
provoked in fact confrontation between industrial economies. In that context, 
countries which had a growth that relied on exports, and whose national income 
distribution was already a function of external competitiviness, such as was the case 
for Japan and Western Germany were in a favorable position. Firms that were 
particularly favored were those that had a profit strategy based either on „permanent 
reduction of costs at constant volume“ such as Toyota or on „innovation and 
flexibility“ notably destined for export markets, such as Honda, or yet again a profit 
strategy based on „volume and diversity“ thanks to internationalization, the buying 
out of other carmakers and the commonalization of car models platforms such as 
Volkswagen.  
Apart from fulfilling this first criterion for profitability, the aforementioned 
three firms had also fulfilled the second one, it is an adequate „enterprise governance 
compromise“ between the main protagonists of the firm concerning „product policy“, 
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„productive organization“, and „employment relationships“, allowing for 
implementation of the chosen strategy in a coherent manner. The other Japanese and 
German carmakers that did not fulfill one or the other of the two criteria began to 
experience difficulties (that no one wanted to recognize at the time due to widespread 
shared perception of the superiority of the „Japanese model“, and to a lesser degree, 
the „German model“), thus well before the turning point of the 1990s that fully 
revealed these difficulties. 
On the contrary, countries whose growth before 1974 had relied on domestic 
consumption and whose national income distribution was regulated by domestic 
productivity gains were destabilized. These include the United States, France, and 
Italy, as well as free market countries having little regulation such as Great Britain. It 
is interesting to note that all carmakers in these countries, without exception, 
underwent at least one serious crisis between 1974 and 1990 and were not able to 
reconstruct or invent a new productive model 
The international context changed once again in the 1990s. The „speculative 
bubble“ had already carried the three aforementioned models to their limits among 
those carmakers embodying them, at the very moment when at least two of them, 
mixed together under the same lean production definition, were being presented as 
the future of the world, a scenario identical to the „Sloanian model“ mise en scène in 
the 1960s. In 1990, Toyota underwent a severe labor crisis that forced it to change its 
„enterprise governance compromise“ and substantially transform its productive 
model. Honda at the same time made an error evaluating emerging demands, and 
Volkswagen, swept up by growth levels, had problems controlling its costs. 
Simultaneously, carmakers previously in difficulty had proceeded to drastically 
reorganize and implement some major strategic reorientations. The bursting of the 
„speculative bubble“, restrictive budgetary policies, the „emergence“ of a certain 
number of countries, and above all the transformation of „national income 
distribution and growth system“ were to change relationships between countries, 
automobile demand, mobilizable labor, and automobile geography. 
Most industrialized countries abandoned national income distribution based on 
internal productivity. Some of them had adopted a „competitive“ national income 
distribution, that is to say, one based on local and categorial agreements. Directly or 
indirectly they destabilized the countries that have been privileged by the previous 
international context (notably Germany and Japan) and that maintained a largely 
coordinated and moderately unequal distribution. The nature and meaning of 
confrontation between countries thus changed. It is within this context that differents 
tendancies to recomposition of the world were to occur: general liberalization of 
exchange, constitution of regional spaces, reaffirmation of somes nations. In addition, 
„competitive“ income distribution system, through the economic and social 
differences thus created, gave birth to a second automobile market, that of pick-ups, 
minivans, recreational vehicles, and other conceptually innovative vehicles. This 
second market, which now has become as important as that of sedans in the United 
States, has attributed a new and expanded degree of pertinence to the „innovation and 
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flexibility“ strategy that Honda and other firms such as Chrysler and Renault 
subsequently adopted. Today, automobile firms must bet on the world’s 
recomposition type as well as the national income distribution and growth system that 
will prevail in the next ten years, to choose a pertinent profit strategy and to construct 
strong „enterprise governance compromises“. 
This new representation of the history of the automobile industry derived from 
research at GERPISA does not offer the same simplicity as the three successive 
models of IMVP, that were easy to remember and apparently even easier to apply! 
Should this be regretted? Though it continues to prevail to this day, it presents the 
unfortunate inconvenience of simply being a fairy tale. 
Are actors of the firms (stockholders, banks, directors, workers, unions, 
suppliers, etc.) now deprived of a convenient compass due to the relative complexity 
inherent to the new proposed representation of automobile industry history? If a 
number of possibilities exist, how can one choose an productive model which is 
economically pertinent and socially acceptable? Why have some firms not succeeded 
in embodying or inventing a model, and have experienced long periods of 
oscillationbetween loss and profit, some even disappearing altogether? 
Contrary to appearances, a more complex and long term vision of the history of 
the automobile sector allows one to highlight general and valid rules for all periods 
and areas. These consist in more operational rules from a practical and scientific 
standpoint than those affirming the existence of a single performant model for each 
important period accompanied by naïve encouragement of its general adoption. The 
analysis of firms and subsidiaries trajectories, as carried out by GERPISA, allows us 
to bring two essential conditions for profitability to light and to define the 
possibilities of action for firm’s actors to invent or adopt production forms that can 
become the object of acceptable compromise by all. 
 Two essential conditions for profitability 
These two conditions can be summed up in two sentences: 
1. The pertinence of „profit strategy“ in relationship to „national income 
distribution and growth modes“ in those countries where the firm evolves; 
2. The solidity of the „enterprise governance compromise“ that allows the firm’s 
actors to find and implement the means („product policy“, „productive 
organization“, and „employment relationships“) that are both coherent in light of 
the adopted profit strategy and acceptable by all these actors, in other words, the 
invention or adoption of a productive model. 
Hence, productive models can be defined as „enterprise governance 
compromises“ that allow „profit strategies“ to be implemented, and that are viable 
within the „ national income distribution and growth system“ of the countries 
wherein firms are active, through coherent means accepted by all the actors. 
Inversely, firms that have not succeeded in inventing or adopting a productive 
model, are firms that have not fulfilled at least one of the two conditions required for 
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profitability. Either their profit strategy was not pertinent relative to the national 
income distribution and growth system or else became non-viable following changes in 
growth systems, or a „enterprise governance compromise“ was never elaborated among 
the firm’s actors or else was rejected by one or several protagonists (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: GERPISA, Robert Boyer, Michel Freyssenet 
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What is the meaning of „profit strategy“, „income distribution and growth 
system“, „enterprise governance compromise“, „product policy“, „productive 
organization“, and „employment relationships“? Historical studies have shown that 
carmakers have not relied on the same profit sources. Two reasons can explain this 
phenomenon. First, profit sources can not all be exploitable at any time and 
anywhere. Second, they are not all compatible among themselves due to their 
contradictory requirements. This is why above all firms distinguish themselves by 
their different combinations of profit sources, in other words, by what we have 
defined as their „profit strategies“. Profit source combinations do not necessarily nor 
always result from a conscious and/or deliberate choice, but from a progressive 
adjustment process (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2000). 
The number of profit sources directly linked to automobile production comes to 
six: economies of scale, supply diversity, product quality, pertinent commercial 
innovation, productive flexibility, and permanent reduction of costs at a constant 
volume. During the first century of automobile production, carmakers implemented at 
least six different profit strategies that we have mentioned by name of special profit 
sources: the „diversity and flexibility“ strategy, the „volume“ strategy, the „volume 
and diversity“ strategy, the „quality“ strategy, the „permanent reduction of costs at 
constant volume“ strategy, and the „innovation and flexibility“ strategy. 
These „profit strategies“ were not all equally appropriate at all times and in all 
places. In order to be so, they each require specific types of markets and labor that 
only certain National income distribution and growth systems provide. To illustrate 
this briefly, one can say for example that the „volume“ strategy – consisting in 
massively producing a unique product – requires (in order to be viable in the long 
term) continued and socially undifferentiated progressive buying power of the 
population as well as a labor force that accepts work conditions associated with 
homogenous production. In contrast, the „quality“ strategy – consisting in offering 
executive range models that symbolize the prestigious economic and social status of 
the buyer – prospers in countries where a substantially proportion of stabilized high 
revenues exist, and where one may also find a relatively more skilled work force. 
„National income distribution and growth systems“ are not numerous and 
several countries can implement the same system simultaneously or at different times. 
This is why certain profit strategies can simultaneously be found in several areas or 
during several historical periods. Inversely, the same „national income distribution 
and growth system“ can guarantee for the viability of several „profit strategies“. This 
is why there is neither universal productive model, nor national productive models. 
„National income distribution and growth systems“ are differentiated by the 
major source of growth (investment, consumption, or exportation) and by the form of 
income distribution („competitive“, „regulated“ in function of internal productivity or 
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external competitiveness, etc.). For example, the system called „competitive and 
competed“, because growth depends on competitiviness of each firm in national and 
international market and because the national income distribution system depends on 
local and professional agreements was that of most of the European countries before 
World War I and of some of them during the inter war period. The system called 
„consumer-oriented and coordinated“, because the growth is based on the internal 
consumption, the national market is protected and the income distribution is 
coordinated at national level in function of internal productivity gains, was that of the 
United States, France, and Italy from 1950’s to1970’s (Boyer, 1990). The system 
called „specialized exporter and coordinated“, because the growth is pushed by 
exporation of specialized products, the market is protected by the quality of products, 
and the income distribution is coordinated in function of external exchange gains, still 
present in Germany to day, and was employed by Sweden. The system called „price-
exporter and coordinated“, because the growth is based on price competitiveness of 
exported goods, the internal market is protected, and the income distribution is 
coordinated in function of external exchange gains“ is that of Japan, South Korea, etc 
(Boyer, Saillard, 1995). 
„Profit strategies“ can not be implemented using any means. The „product 
policy“, „productive organization“, and „employment relationships“ must correspond 
to precise requirements that are specific to each profit strategy. However, in reality, 
they are often the fruit of successive contradictory choices, tensions between actors 
and the firm, or external constraints. Rendering means coherent with the adopted 
„profit strategy“ can only be accomplished and maintained if the firm’s main actors 
first agree on the strategy itself, and then on the means. This agreement can not be 
concluded unless it allows each protagonist the perspective of attaining his/her own 
goals in the mid or long term. No coherence is possible, no profit can be a long 
lasting one without the construction of a solid „enterprise governance compromise“. 
Fortunatelly, „profit strategy“ requirements can be fulfilled in many ways. 
Nothing obliges a firm to submit to the means supposedly imposed by the „profit 
strategy“ selected. In fact, we have been able to observe, for example, that the 
„diversity and flexibility“ strategy was implemented not by a single productive 
model, but by two different models at the same period and in the same country, that is 
to say the „Taylorian model“ and the Woollardian model“. Likewise, Toyota was 
obliged to change its „enterprise governance compromise“ during the 1990s in order 
to continue implementing its „permanent reduction of costs at constant volume“ 
profit strategy following the labor crisis that it had undergone. 
The emergence or adoption of a productive model that is not based on an 
intellectual conversion and/or application of firmly established dispositions. These 
are in part unintentional processes. They imply the synchronization of conditions that 
render the profit strategy feasible as well as means to implement it (Boyer, Charron, 
Jurgens, Tolliday, 1998). This synchronization often escapes control by enterprise 
players, from both a cognitive and practical standpoint. It is often only after the fact 
that they realize that conditions and means joined together in a system, and thus they 
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proceed to theorize this. Conversely, when they want to adopt a model that has born 
fruit elsewhere, they are never guaranteed that their decisions will indeed allow for 
the synchronization of conditions and means, due to the fact that intervening social 
processes are numerous and the effects of their intersection difficult to predict. Here 
lies precisely the practical utility of social science research, that of identifying social 
processes, dissecting them, and subsequently highlighting the possibility to act so as 
to facilitate actions undertaken by different enterprise players in conformity with their 
specific perspectives. 
 Profit Strategies and Productive Models 
 The „diversity and flexibility“ strategy and the „Taylorian“ and 
„Woollardian“ models 
The „diversity and flexibility“ strategy consists in offering specific automobile 
models corresponding to demands by economically and socially distinct customers 
who express markedly distinguished identity criteria. It also involves rapidly adapting 
to quantitative and qualitative variations in these demands in function of the irregular 
revenue evolutions of this category of customers. 
This type of simultaneously „balkanized“ and unstable market is essentially 
found in a „national income distribution and growth system“ wherein revenue and 
salary formation, instead of being regulated in function of productivity or exterior 
competitiveness, is submitted to „competition“ in function of local and categorial 
power relations. The harshness of social relations leads each social and professional 
group to defend their acquired positions and consolidate them. In such a social and 
economic context, mass demand has difficulty in forming due to highly irregular 
revenue evolutions. This system, which we have called „competitive-competed“, was 
found in a number of countries before World War II, and continued to be the case in 
Great Britain. The „diversity and flexibility“ strategy was logically adopted by most 
European carmakers in the interwar period as well as British firms before the British 
Leyland was created at the end of the 1960s. Is this strategy now part of the past? 
Things are not so sure. The return to systems of „competitive“ salary and revenue 
formation seems to be attributing new pertinence to it. 
To be implemented, the „diversity and flexibility“ strategy requires a product 
policy made up of coherent models, sharing a limiting number of common parts with 
other car-models, responsive to each demand category, and profitable unto 
themselves. The productive organization must allow the firm to rapidly conceive of 
new models at the lowest cost, and change product as often as necessary in function 
of demand variations. Employment relationships must offer compensation for the 
required level of flexibility and competence. At least two productive models have 
implemented the „diversity and flexibility“ strategy: the „Taylorian“ and the 
„Woollardian“ models. However, they differ in their „enterprise governance 
compromises“ as well as by the means employed. 
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What is called „Taylorism“ today has little to do with its historical specificity. 
Indeed, the „Taylor method“ can not be reduced to one or the other of its techniques – 
for example, timekeeping – nor expanded to the separation between conception and 
execution. of which it was but one historical form and certainly not the most 
important. In fact, Taylor had called for a complete production system in order to 
solve one of the most typical problems of diversified production, in small and 
average-sized series, fixed stations, or non-mechanical short assembly lines, that is to 
say what he called „worker idleness“. It is typical of this kind of production, since it 
no longer is a problem once the assembly line is adopted. Everyone recalls that 
Taylor mainly defined „worker idleness“ as a function of management practice 
consisting in decreasing the wage paid per piece and reducing the work force 
whenever an increase in hourly wages was obtained one way or the other. Hence, he 
proposed to reconcile high salaries and inexpensive labor by increasing the value 
added instead of negotiating its distribution. He confirmed that daily production 
could thus be doubled or even quadrupled. He guaranteed that workers would be 
ready and willing to work more efficiently in accordance with a sequence of 
operations and in „scientifically“ – thus impartial – established time frames designed 
by a special team in charge of analyzing and timing both skilled and unskilled tasks. 
The condition was that employers pay those workers accepting the new rules from 30 
to 100% more than the average. The establishment of a standard sequence of 
operations for each task did not question its intellectual logic; as the assembly line 
soon would in its dispersal of operations among different work stations solely for the 
purpose of „saturating“ the cycle time at each work station. Taylor often repeated that 
the „optimal“ sequence and the time required for its execution could only be correctly 
determined with more experienced and efficient workers, and not by a single service 
isolated from fabrication, as has been endlessly reiterated over the past thirty years 
(Nelson, 1980). 
The „Taylor method“ became the „Taylorian model“ when firms pursuing a 
„diversity and flexibility“ strategy adopted it, and when it was adapted to become 
socially acceptable. The „Taylorian model“ was characterized by an „enterprise 
governance compromise“ mainly established between managers, organizational 
engineers, and workers. It is built around the following: 1° a competitive, varied, and 
average-size series product policy; 2° skilled and unskilled task organization 
simultaneously applied in conception, fabrication, and administration, on the one 
hand founded on procedures and required operational modes, and on the other hand, 
allotted time defined by those involved and in accordance with a specialized service; 
3° employment relationships wherein the wage is significantly increased if 
procedures and allotted time are respected or improved. This „compromise“ gave 
firm managers increased productivity and flexibility. Meanwhile, organizational 
engineers were attributed a larger scope of power, and those workers who accepted 
the new work rules received higher salaries. Thus, the „Taylorian“ model was 
profitably adopted where series were sufficiently long enough to obtain a benefit 
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from preparing and normalizing tasks. This was to be the case for several American 
and French carmakers in the interwar period. 
British carmakers in the interwar period generally chose another „enterprise 
governance compromise“ so as to produce a variety of distinct cars destined for a 
„balkanized“ and limited market, and to avoid confronting a skilled and categorically 
organized labor force. This method consisted first in relying on individual and 
collective know-how as well as the autonomy of this workforce in order to obtain 
required levels of flexibility; second in mechanizing and synchronizing supply to 
fixed workstations or short, non-mechanized assembly lines to reduce intermediate 
stocks and handling. Demands in volume and delays were obtained by a salary 
system qualified as „incentive“ or „inductive“ characterized by a piece rate, which 
could be highly increased by individual or group bonuses attributed in function of 
produced volume and the time used to accomplish this. This original productive 
model, which we have called the „Woollardian model“ (named after Frank Woollard, 
production engineer at Morris, main theorist and craftsman of the method), 
guaranteed to firm owners and managers a regular return on invested capital, offered 
required quantitative and qualitative flexibility to production engineers, and attributed 
the requested level of autonomy and work qualification corresponding to workers’ 
demands (Woollard, 1924, Tolliday, 1998, Zeitlin, 2000).  
As one may easily observe, the „Taylorian“ and „Woollardian“ models were 
completely different yet implemented the same profit strategy. These models 
encountered a crisis when the profit strategy they implemented lost its pertinence, for 
example when the distribution of national income becames more coordinated, 
predictable, and moderately inegalitarian. The firms that progressively made up 
British Leyland in the 1960s and 1970s failed to become again profitable trying to 
make the transition from the „Woollardian“ model to the „Taylorian“ model that they 
hoped would bring about a greater degree of discipline among workers. The reason 
was the Taylorian model was also ill-adapted to the new British national income 
distribution and growth system. 
 The „volume“ strategy and the Fordian model 
The „volume“ strategy consists of distributing costs among the largest number 
possible of vehicles, costs that are not immediately adjustable to demand. The best 
implementation of this strategy is the massive production of a unique model for as 
long as possible. It demands a growing and homogeneous market that is satisfied with 
one or a few standardized models, and also requires a sufficient quantity of workforce 
that accepts an undifferentiated production and work. 
This explains why the „volume“ strategy“ was only temporarily viable during 
very short phases of mass automobile market take-offs, such as Henry Ford’s Model 
T and Volkswagen’s Beetle. Only egalitarian regimes based on a centralized and/or 
administrated economic system could, in theory, guarantee „volume“ strategy 
conditions over the long term. However, the latter generally do not provide the means 
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to efficiently implement this. An example is the Avtovaz experience in the case of the 
Soviet economy. Irregularity of supply and the impossibility of making investment, 
salary, and workforce volume decisions did not allow Avtovaz to obtain the same 
results as Fiat’s Mirafiori plant for its Togliattigrad plant, even though the former was 
its direct transposition. Indeed, a technical tool only is efficient when the employment 
relations are coherent with it. 
Hence, the „volume“ strategy requires the following in order to be implemented: 
conceiving a product that responds to basic demands for individual transportation of 
the population at large, a stabilized productive organization allowing for standardized 
production in regularly increased and continuous flow, and sufficiently attractive 
employment relationships so the firm may benefit from an increasing volume of 
workers, but sufficiently constraining so that they accept repeating similar tasks. 
The „Fordian“ model has responded to these demands with a product policy 
consisting in offering a unique, „integrated“, reliable, and inexpensive car model to 
the population at large or to an average clientele within each large segment of the 
market; a standardized, continuous, and strongly integrated productive organization 
based on mechanized displacement of the product, task breakdown into elementary 
operations redistributed among work stations with the sole purpose of saturating 
cycle time periods; and employment relationships guaranteeing workers lacking 
required skills a fixed salary that is not dependent on profits, and whose buying 
power regularly progresses (Hounshell, 1984 ; Freyssenet, 1998). Volkswagen was 
able to develop the most robust Fordian „enterprise governance compromise“ and 
proved to be profitable for almost twenty-five years (Jurgens, 1998). 
The „Fordian“ model experienced a crisis long before the market become a 
renewed market in countries where it had been applied. Indeed, national 
differentiation in revenues and automobile demand rapidly reduced the viability of a 
„volume“ strategy and „enterprise governance compromise“ based on rigid 
organization and uniform and high wages. 
 The „volume and diversity“ strategy and the „Sloanian“ model 
This strategy combines two profit sources, volume and diversity, have long been 
considered as incompatible. In the 1920s and 1930s, General Motors found the 
solution to overcoming this contradiction by having different models share a 
maximum number of invisible parts among them, thus reducing diversity to one only 
perceptible by the customer, in other words, body, sadlery and equipment. 
This strategy is only possible if „surface“ diversity is commercially acceptable. 
For this, demand must be moderately differentiated from an economic, social, and 
geographic standpoint. This can only be found in countries where national income 
distribution is nationally coordinated and moderatly inegalitarian. The „volume and 
diversity“ strategy also implies having an abundant workforce at one’s disposal that 
accepts polyvalence in order to face variations and variety in production. These 
conditions were fully satisfied in a certain number of industrialized countries 
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beginning in the 1940s in the United States and Sweden, the 1950s in West Germany, 
France, and Italy, the 1960s in Japan and Spain, and the secont part of 1980s in South 
Korea. Since the 1980s, generally speaking, these conditions have become less 
satisfied. The introduction of more „competitive“ income distribution, notably in the 
private sector whereas public sector wages remain coordinated and moderately 
inegalitarian, contributed to the emergence of a more dispersed second automobile 
market (four-wheel drive, pick-ups, recreational vehicles, monospaces, etc.) for 
which the „volume and diversity“ strategy is less pertinent. 
The product policy of a „volume and diversity“ strategy must therefore consist in 
a finely hierarchized range covering the principle segments of the market, and generally 
excluding both very low and high quality models as well as „niches“ vehicles 
corresponding to only a small number of customers. Productive organization must 
allow for diversity and variations in demand among vehicles, versions, and options, so 
that both over and under capacities will be avoided, and so that complexity in supply, 
conception, fabrication, and distribution be fully controlled. Insofar as employment 
relationships are concerned, they must fulfill two requirements: attract an abundant 
number of workers while valorizing polyvalence, and remain coherent within a 
moderately inegalitarian national income distribution system. 
The „Sloanian“ model (named after Alfred Sloan, under whose presidency this 
model was theorized and constructed at General Motors) is the model that implemented 
the „volume and diversity“ strategy. It relies on an „enterprise governance 
compromise“ essentially established between managers and one or several powerful 
and professionalized unions. It thus takes on the form of a „social compromise“ 
wherein accepting work organization and promoting social peace is compensated by 
programmed growth in worker’s buying power, promotions in the workplace, and the 
expansion of both social protection and union rights. The „Sloanian“ product policy is 
multi-brand, offering parallel ranges whose models of same market segment share the 
same platform while offering a number of versions and options. Productive 
organization is characterized by the centralization of strategic choices and the 
decentralization of their implementation within divisions; relying on subsidiaries or 
sub-contractors for numerous components so as to displace a part of diversity to them 
and to benefit lower prices due to their economies of scale obtained thanks the orders 
from other clients; machine polyvalence (multi-specialized) and mechanical assembly 
lines with buffers to saturate the production tool despite vehicle variety. Employment 
relationships consist of applying the „enterprise governance compromise“ under the 
union’s control, and in the name of polyvalent workers paid in function of job 
evaluation of work stations they successively have (Volpato, 1984, Kuhn, 1986). 
Product policy and productive organization were clearly defined as of the 1930s 
by General Motors. But the „Sloanian“ model was only genuinely formed in the 
1940s. To obtain the synchronization of the „volume and diversity“ strategy and 
sloanian employment relationships with the American „national income distribution 
and growth system“, one had to await that income distribution becomes coordinated 
and moderatly inegalitarian. This synchronization strarted spectacularly by the 
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agreement concluded at General Motors after a 113-day strike in 1946, and then 
served as a matrix for wage policy nationwide. It was at the origin of the „abundant 
years“ period, later called the „Fordist“ period, an erroneous labeling and quite unjust 
for Sloan. Ford and Chrysler also adhered to the Sloanian model. The progressive 
adoption by most industrialized countries in the 1950s and 1960s of the same income 
distribution as that of the United States, even if the origin of gains was different, led 
several carmakers to try to adopt „Sloanian“ model: Peugeot, Renault and Simca in 
France, Fiat in Italy, Nissan in Japan. A „one best way“ seemed to have been found, 
and during the 1960s many experts announced the necessary convergence of all 
productive systems towards this productive model (Sloan, 1963 ; Freyssenet, 1998, 
Volpato, 1983, Raff, 1999). 
The „Sloanian“ model began to encounter some difficulties at the end of the 
1960s. As we all know, it can only last if its profit strategy can be continued and all 
concluding parties respect the „enterprise governance compromise“. While being 
presented as the „machine“ generating the society of abundance and leisure, 
productivity gains it had generated began to decline in the United States following 
stagnation in economies of scale. The American market began a renewal market and 
exports and commonalization were unsuffisant for growth in volume. In France and 
Italy, the difficulties of „Sloanian“ model came from the rejection by younger 
generations of „enterprise governance compromise“ (Freyssenet, 1996, 1997 ; 
Camuffo, Volpato 1998) These difficulties could have been surmounted if monetary 
policy enacted by the United States to readjust their progressively deteriorating trade 
balance had not, through a series of domino effects, led to the oil crisis and 
interruption of world growth rates. Countries whose „National income distribution 
and growth systems“ were „consumer oriented and coordinated“ were destabilized by 
countries whose systems were „exporting oriented and coordinated“. From this 
moment, the „Sloanian“ model encountered in these latter countries better conditions 
for long life due to economies of scale brought on by exports and to income 
distribution based on external competitiveness. From 1974 on, Volkswagen 
successfully applied the „Sloanian“ model through a policy of growth outside of the 
European arena, the systematic commonalization of platforms for purchased brand 
car models, and export ( Jurgens, 1989). 
 The „quality“ strategy, seeking a model for long-lasting profitability 
The term „quality“ signifies not only reliability and the vehicle’s performance 
level, but also – and perhaps even moreso – the social distinction of a particular style, 
the use of certain materials, refined finishing touches, a high price and the prestige of a 
brand that reflects the aspirations of wealthy and distinguished customers ready to pay 
the price. This strategy leads firms adopting it to specialize in luxury range products, or 
more recently, to respond to the superior portion of each market’s segment. This is why 
firms are often called „specialists“ as opposed to „generalist“ firms that produce for the 
large mass of consumers. Profits are essentially generated from price margins 
authorized by the product and executive range oriented customers. 
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The „quality“ strategy has the largest degree of relevance in both space and 
time. Only a few societies lack a wealthy population category ready to pay a high 
price so as to possess products that represent their high-ranking economic and social 
position. This is why the luxury and executive range market was first and foremost an 
international one, and still remains so today. But the „specialized exporter and 
coordinated system“ is in favour to „quality“ strategy. 
For the period more particularly studied by GERPISA, that is to say, particularly 
since the 1960s, no firm having adopted the „quality“ strategy (BMW, Mercedes, 
Saab, and Volvo) experienced a break-even point constantly above added value. 
Though their profit strategy was appropriate, their „enterprise governance 
compromise“ was not sufficiently robust – despite a socially favorable environment – 
to overcome the labor crisis all these firms encountered, not only in the 1960s like so 
many other carmakers, but also in the 1970s and 1980s. Nor did it allow them to 
control supplier costs. All these firms attempted to apply „socio-technical“ solutions 
to the labor crisis, for example, by considerably enlarging cycle times, introducing 
modular work, and/or systematically improving work station ergonomics. In addition, 
the image of quality itself, essential to maintain for obvious commercial reasons, 
could be reinforced by publicity concerning new production methods (Gerst, 
Hardwig, Kulmann, Schuman, 1999). They were presented more dignified than „mass 
production“ methods for the demanding customer who wanted „his/her car“ to be the 
object of special attention. Volvo went the furthest along the path of „work reform“ 
by radically splitting from the assembly line, replacing it with assembling in fixed 
parallel stations, notably in its new Uddevalla plant (Ellegard, Engström, Nilsson, 
1991 ; 1995, 1999). But both at Volvo and other firms, employment relationships and 
product policy were not coherently conceived of in relation to the new productive 
organization so as to generate as much benefit as possible in terms of personalization 
of response to demand (be it in the realm of delays, costs, product improvement and 
adaptation, and service). 
Rising costs, unfavorable exchange rates, unemployment growth, and price wars 
brought about a limitation and finally the abandon of this chosen path. However, a 
new „enterprise governance compromise“ concerning new product policy, productive 
organization, and employment relationships was not established. General Motor’s and 
Ford’s take over of Saab and Volvo, respectively, most probably hails a radical 
trajectory change for both Swedish carmakers (Berggren, 2000). 
 The „permanent cost reductions at a constant volume“ strategy and the 
„Toyotan“ model 
With this strategy, cost reductions at a constant volume occurs continuously and 
in all circumstances. Other profit sources are additionally exploited only if they do 
not inhibit the main priority, that of reducing costs at a constant volume. The goal is 
to be prepared for any eventuality so as to remain profitable since nothing is really 
ever sure. This consists in reducing cost prices both internally and vis-a-vis suppliers 
through continuous savings. 
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This has been Toyota’s strategy since the 1950s. It is particularly adapted to a 
„national income distribution and growth system“ based on the export of competitive 
products through pricing and to an income distribution system determined by exterior 
competitiveness (the „price-exporter and coordinated system“). 
To be implemented, it requires a product policy that chooses to ignore 
innovative models because of their high financial risk. It also requires a constantly 
evolving productive organization that is not based on technological take-offs so as to 
eliminate „waste“ of all sorts, as well as employment relationships that tolerate 
continued reduction in the number of workers at constant volume. 
The Toyotan model answers to these demands with a product policy that aims at 
satisfying average demand in each large segment of the market. This is accomplished 
by offering models whose commercial characteristics are well grounded, have little 
excess in diversity (such as options), and are planified quantitatively so as to grow 
regularly (Lung, Chanaron, Fujimoto, Raff 2000). The method consists in applying a 
„just-in-time“ productive organization both internally and with suppliers, the goal 
being to reveal problems inhibiting a continuous and regular flow at the origin of 
waste in time, workmanship, materials, energy, tools, and space. In addition, 
employment relationships motivate workers to reduce standard time spent within each 
workstation by making wages and promotion dependent on the accomplishment of 
cost reduction management goals (Cusumano, 1985, Shimizu, 1999). 
Managers, workers, and suppliers essentially agree upon the „enterprise gover-
nance compromise“. It is based on large-scale workers and suppliers implication. In 
exchange workers obtain job security, wages increase, and promotions, and suppliers 
guarantees for a volume of production and profits. 
Up to the 1990s, the Toyotan model conferred an exceptional degree of 
expansion and profitability upon the firm. It thus appeared to be the „optimal“ model 
since it guaranteed for a firm’s competitiveness, worker participation and job 
security, as well as general satisfaction on the part of all buyers (Durand, Stewart, 
Castillo, 1999). However, competitiveness is not guaranteed in all circumstances. 
When a demand for innovative models develops, the firm incarnating the Toyotan 
model cannot respond. It has no other choice but to copy and improve upon 
innovative models already on the market as quickly as possible. That is why a firm 
like Honda was able to develop and become profitable alongside Toyota. The 
Toyotan model is shaken by brutal changes, be they in exchange rates or currency 
parity levels, that can strike down with one blow all the patient and continual efforts 
demanded of both workers and suppliers. Pushed to its limits in a tense labor market 
coupled with explosive demand, it is then criticized by workers, as was the case in 
Toyota. At the beginning of the 1990s, Toyota had to substantially change its model 
to the point where, in all exactness, it will soon have to be called by another name 
once a new „enterprise governance compromise“ has been elaborated (Shimizu 1999 ; 
Fujimoto, 1999). 
 The „innovation and flexibility“ strategy and the Hondian model 
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This strategy consists of designing conceptually innovative models that respond 
to emerging expectations and demands, produce them massively and immediately if 
commands confirm this anticipation, so as to make a profit from the risk taken before 
competitors then choose to invest in the newly created market segment; or, on the 
other hand, to abandon the innovative model(s) rapidly and at the least cost in the 
event of commercial failure. This was Honda’s strategy from the moment it entered 
the automobile industry. It also has become Chrysler’s strategy that, since the end of 
the 1980s, has reunited with its former conceptually innovative model policy. Last 
but not least, it has been Renault’s strategy since the beginning of the 1990s. 
This strategy presupposes „National income distribution and growth systems“ 
where by the needs and lifestyles of social categories evolve periodically or where 
economically and socially distinctive population categories emerge. This is 
particularly the case for „National income distribution and growth modes“ wherein 
income distribution is more „competitive“. Different social or professional categories 
of the population are periodically privileged by this form of distribution and seek to 
translate their new and favorable economic position through an automobile demand 
that distinguishes them from others and/or responds to their very specific demands. 
However, the history of the automobile industry is made up of firms pursuing 
the „innovation and flexibility“ strategy that have failed whereas demand for 
innovative cars still remained present due to adequate income distribution system. 
Indeed the risks of this strategy are apparent. Among them: an innovation that does 
not (or poorly) find its public, over or underestimation of the demand’s latent volume, 
loss of capacity to successfully innovate over the long term, refusal by investors, the 
temptation to follow in the footsteps of the „big generalist firms“ following an initial 
success. To be implemented, the „innovation and flexibility“ strategy requires that the 
firm takes necessary financial risks and be capable of regularly offering commercially 
pertinent innovative vehicles. It requires a very reactive productive organization, be it 
in the realm of conception, fabrication, and/or distribution, so as to respond to and 
saturate demand before competition copies the model. The productive organization 
must likewise be capable of withdrawing the model rapidly and at the lowest cost if it 
does not find a public. It must establish employment relationships that encourage 
useful innovation and the capacity to completely change production projects at all 
levels of the firm. 
Today, of the three carmakers pursuing this strategy, only Honda has genuinely 
constructed a productive model that responds to all these demands. It did so even 
though it was still producing motorcycles, then consolidated and completed it when it 
became a carmaker. The model that one may now call „Hondian“ answers to the 
„innovation and flexibility“ strategy demands through a conceptually innovative 
product policy, each model having their own platform, yet forming an entirely 
coherent technical and stylistic structure. It is also based on productive organization 
characterized by a low integration rate to limit negative financial impact in the event 
of failure, and inversely, to respond more easily to success. In addition, the 
production structure is easily convertible without having to rely on large-scale 
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engineering efforts. This means low automation level, and innovators allowed to 
express themselves in conception, to create their teams and accomplish their chosen 
projects. Employment relationships favor the emergence within the firm of 
technically and commercially competent innovators found at all levels thanks to 
recruitment, salary, and promotion policies that value expertise and individual 
initiative more than a diploma, age, or seniority, and in same way more than 
hierarchical responsibilities. Last but not least, the firm boasts good working 
conditions, offering the lowest annual, weekly, and daily work periods of the sector 
(Mair, 1994, Freyssenet, Mair, 2000). 
The „enterprise governance compromise“ that founded the Hondian model was 
agreed upon by managers (legitimized by their own personal innovative qualities 
and/or their capacity to value those of others for the benefit of the firm and its 
employees) and employees themselves who where called upon to express their 
personal ideas and experiences regarding the product and its process. It therefore 
excludes banks, shareholders, and suppliers who generally refuse the indispensable 
necessity of taking risks. The firm is self-financed and has not established a single 
association with suppliers. 
However, Honda has also experienced difficulties with the „speculative bubble“. 
It believed that demands within the context of long lasting growth were for 
increasingly luxurious and executive range vehicles and sports cars, and thus 
completely neglected the emerging demand for monospaces and recreational vehicles. 
Only recently has it (successfully) rectified this approach in product policy by 
launching the much appreciated leisure vehicles. 
Again the world changes the machine: new income growth and distribution 
systems, new confrontations between countries, and the recomposition of the world 
How can the preceeding analysis approach allow phenomena observed during 
the 1990s to be interpreted, such as the decrease in competitiveness gaps between 
carmakers, turnaround of European and American firms, difficulties encountered by 
certain Japanese firms, the new globalization wave, the emergence of newly 
industrialized countries accompanied by implantations of new carmakers, regional or 
worldwide organization of firms, mergers-acquisitions-alliances, the explosion in 
demand for recreational, semi-utilitarian and „niches“ vehicles, the new importance 
of shareholders, etc..  
 The two world confrontations and their outcomes 
Indeed, the beginning of the 1990s represents a major turning point, notably 
concerning the consequences emanating from a double confrontation: one between 
capitalist and communist countries, and the other between on the one hand countries 
that are consumer-oriented, protected and having a nationally coordinated and 
moderately inegalitarian income distribution based on internal productivity gains, and 
on the other, those that are export-oriented, protected, also having a nationally 
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coordinated and moderately inegalitarian income distribution, but based on exterior 
competitiveness. 
As a surprise to many, the first confrontation led to the implosion of the vast 
majority of communist countries as well as the access to new areas for capitalist 
firms, particularly in the automobile industry. The confrontation with the „Socialist 
camp“ had largely contributed to the emergence of newly industrialized countries, 
particularly in Asia, with the design of protecting them from coming under 
Communist regime. Notably thanks to access to the United States market, these 
countries were able to adopt an industrialization path based on the export of 
manufactured products, first at low value added cost, and after with higher value 
added, all the while protecting their domestic market.  
The second confrontation did not culminate in the convergence of all countries 
towards the „winner“ income growth and distribution system, that is „export oriented, 
protected and coordinated distribution in function of external competitiveness gains“ 
system. During the eighties, the countries applying it were considered as a model (the 
Japanese model, the German model, the Swedish model). Though France and Italy 
moved closer to this model, the United States chose another path. They conserved 
their „consumer-oriented“ growth, but adopted a new national income distribution 
based on „competition“. Revenue structure and demand were modified as well as 
employment conditions and mobilizable labor. Massive injection of public financing 
during the 1980s, the oil „counter-shock“, changes in the equivalence of monetary 
exchange , new facilities to create a firm, adjusting employment and wages and 
mobilizing capital, all these factors contributed to a growth cycle that, since the 
1990s, has made the United States the country upon which the rest of the world’s 
growth depends. In addition, the liberalization of capital circulation and investment 
has significantly enhanced the position of one actor in the firm, the shareholder. 
Beginning in the United States then spreading to other countries, shareholders have 
been demanding increasing amounts of return on their invested capital (Boyer, 
Freyssenet, 1999). 
From that point on, countries with a nationally coordinated and moderately 
unequal income distribution were destabilized. This first occurred in Japan, Germany 
and Sweden, but also in France and Italy, the latters having extroverted themselves 
somewhat, all the while limiting deregulation of wages. European countries and 
Japan had difficulty reacting, the former due to their restrictive budgetary policy, the 
latter due to financial uncertainty increasingly slumping domestic demand. European 
countries always had – and still have – one alternative; the regionalization of growth 
and exchange, in other words, the European Union, whose growth can still be self-
centered and whose income distribution can be regionally coordinated while not 
being too dissimilar. Japan’s historical and political isolation within its own region 
deprives it of this perspective, unless the crisis of emerging Asian countries, and 
pressure from the United States to further open up their borders (the Communist 
threat – or supposed – having disappeared) succeed in convincing Japan’s neighbors 
to regionally group together with Japan. 
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 Effects of the worldwide double confrontation on the automobile industry  
The change in „National income distribution and growth systems“ in certain 
countries belonging to the Triad, the introduction of some limited „competitive“ 
modalities in wage and revenue formation in others, the liberalization of capital 
circulation, the emergence of new industrialized countries and their ensuing crisis, the 
transition towards a capitalist economy by former Communist-regime countries in 
Eastern Europe and Asia, contradictory trends in the world’s recomposition between 
globalization and regionalization, and the reaffirmation of a certain number of very 
important nations, all these factors have had several effects on the worldwide 
automobile industry (Boyer 1988, 1990, 1996): 
 a change in power relations between carmakers as well as between actors within 
the firm; 
 strong growth followed by a drop in automobile demand in emerging or former 
Communist countries; 
 the creation of a second automobile market, that of semi-utilitarian, recreational, 
and „niches“ vehicles corresponding to new categories of the population 
engendered by their more or less fortunate income in the competition for share 
of internal productivity gains or external competitiveness. 
 Changes in power relations between carmakers as well as between actors 
within the firm 
This initial effect was observed in the difficulties experienced by Japanese, 
Korean and East-european carmakers during the 1990s, while simultaneously 
witnessing the recovery of American and European carmakers. Tensions provoked by 
the speculative bubble, a slump in the Japanese domestic market, the yen’s valuation, 
effects brought about by American and European restructuring on Japanese 
competitiveness, all these factors revealed the limits of Japanese carmakers and even 
the high degree of fragility among some of them. Notably, Nissan, Mazda, and 
Mitsubishi, firms that had not constructed a solid „enterprise governance 
compromise“ and had gone into considerable debt, could not resist. Only Toyota and 
Honda, which had been self-financing their development for quite some time in 
conformity with their own „profit strategy“, could not only preserve their 
independence but also pursue their growth. Nevertheless they did not entirely 
preserve its dominant position, in relation to American and European carmakers. 
Once again, it was the „world“ that changed the „machine“ by modifying conditions 
and possibilities for the implementation of profit strategies and productive models . 
This reversal of the world conditions was seized upon by a certain number of 
European and American firms that perceived themselves as being too regionalized. 
They considered their globalization as a necessity for their profitability in the future. 
They took control of Japanese, Korean or East-european firms: Ford of Mazda, 
Renault of Nissan, Dacia and Samsung, Daimler-Chrysler of Mitsubishi. Many 
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American and European automobile firms competed to take control of Daewoo and to 
form an alliance with Hyundaï, and may be Avtovaz (Freyssenet, Lung, 2000). 
Among the various measures employed by certain American, European firms, 
and now Japanese firms, to lower their break-even point, to improve control variety, 
and to adjust more easely their production capacity to circumstantial variations in 
demand, there is one that stands out due both to its long term and worldwide 
ramifications: the outsourcing of a number of activities in conception and fabrication 
to (already or recent) independent first-rank suppliers. These suppliers have in fact 
been put in a position to structure and manage automobile activity in their area of 
competence. They have acquired great importance, and only the future will tell if 
carmakers will be able to control them (Eckardt, A., Köhler, H-D., Pries, L. (1999). 
The liberalization of capital circulation, designed to facilitate new investment, 
has also modified power relations between the firm’s actors. It has allowed 
shareholders to have mobile capital to demand improved returns. They push 
managers to reorientate the firm towards potentially more profitable activity, notably 
services linked to the automobile. A new player in the construction of „enterprise 
governance compromise“ obligates a change in the productive model. However, it is 
important to recall that many carmakers have strived to maintain their financial 
independence, notably the three most profitable firms: Toyota, Honda, and 
Volkswagen. 
 Just what is emerging? 
The development of automobile markets in emerging countries and in former 
Communist countries has encouraged the quasi-totality of carmakers to go there, 
searching a volume growth that they can no longer obtain from the Triad countries. 
They thought that eventual upsets in the development of some of these countries or in 
transition for the others would not affect the irreversible trend towards growth. Long 
before the Asian crisis and ensuing shock waves, GERPISA’s analytical approach 
had led it to express some doubts about these predictions for several reasons. The so-
called „emerging countries“ owed their growth to the export of manufactured 
products at a growing added value to those industrialized countries who did not 
oppose this type of growth, for geo-political, economic, or social reasons. However, 
since the disappearance of the „Socialist camp“ and success in exporting at higher 
value added by these countries, one could observe increasing pressure placed on 
them, to open their markets. Hence, their growth rate was not guaranteed to evolve at 
the same rhythm. The 1997 financial crisis also revealed that development in these 
countries had relied on debt, and that local deficient and blind international 
institutions had allowed this to reach an intolerable level, at least from a long-term 
perspective. Did this Asian crisis provoke the painful but beneficial rectification 
allowing emerging countries to start again on a more healthy and solid basis? This is 
possible but not entirely certain (Humphrey, Lecler, Salerno, 2000). 
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These countries will now have less control of their development since American 
and European firms have taken over certain important local firms that have gone 
bankrupt, notably in South Korea. They will also have to rely more on domestic 
consumption. Yet (with the exception of South Korea), national income distribution 
remains highly unequal in this area since the 1980s, inequalities even increasing 
considerably since the crisis. The constitution or consolidation of a middle class 
susceptible to generating mass automobile demand is constantly put off by periodical 
financial or political crises. In addition, there is little chance that these countries will 
adopt a nationally coordinated and moderately inegalitarian distribution system in the 
near future. Automobile demand will certainly develop, however it will revolve more 
around demand for luxurious and executive-range cars and light trucks, and 
extremely low priced vehicles that remain to be designed, rather than demand for 
wisely hierarchized sedans.  
Insofar as former Communist countries are concerned – beginning with the 
foremost among them, i.e. Russia – it was obvious that in the absence of institutions 
allowing for a market to function, these countries were not able to make a rapid 
transition to capitalism, one that is profitable to firms offering equipment products to 
the population at large, such as the automobile. 
Anticipation made by firms for the future of these countries were probably both 
quantitatively and qualitatively erroneous. As of now, capacities installed seem too 
extensive in relation to mid-term demand previsions within this new context. Fiat is 
certainly the carmaker that has the most harshly experienced the turn around of 
markets in emerging countries, due to its massive financial and human resource 
investment there, to the detriment of the European market. Recorded losses most 
probably explain its alliance with General Motors. 
 The two automobile markets 
Since the mid 1980s in the United States and the 1990s in Japan and Europe, a 
demand for conceptually innovative vehicles from a practical and symbolic 
standpoint has emerged, especially in industrialized countries: light trucks, sports 
utilitarian vehicles, monospaces, recreational vehicles, urban four-wheel drives, 
„niche“ cars, mini-cars, etc. Today this demand represents between a quarter to a half 
of the automobile market, according to the country. Its concomitance with the 
deregulation of revenue formation is striking. Thus, it appears that the second market 
emanates from new categories of the population that express through automobile 
demand their own economic and social trajectory. This radical change in the market 
structure has had several consequences. 
It has rendered the „innovation and flexibility“ strategy (adopted by Chrysler 
and Renault, following Honda) much more profitable than before. It has allowed Ford 
and General Motors, imitating Chrysler, to encounter less competition from Japanese 
carmakers and their transplants, and to generate substantial profits. On the other hand, 
it has created harsh mid-term dilemmas that need solving.  
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If the second automobile market is consolidated and even extends from a 
volume standpoint, it will destabilize carmakers pursuing a „volume and diversity“ 
and „reduction of costs at a constant volume“ strategies. Indeed, it requires that firms 
regularly offer innovative vehicles to new and renewed population categories. 
However, as we have seen, the risk involved with conceptually innovative vehicles is 
that it conflicts with these strategies. The firms that implement them will be obliged 
to imitate the innovative car models. But will they obtain the required level of volume 
to make profit? Indeed the „innovative and flexible“ firms will always know how to 
saturate new demand quickly once the market has validated proposed innovative 
models. Likewise, the „innovative“ vehicle supposes that it differs from classical 
models, and not only on the surface. If the market becomes more and more 
balkanized, and due to a national income distribution more „competitive“, the 
commonalization of classic and innovative car platforms will be less acceptable to the 
customers. 
The sedan classical range is not fixed. A top-line demand of small and medium 
cars and recreational vehicles emerged, along with new buyers for luxury cars. These 
tendencies explain the attempts of Mercedes (through Classe A and Smart) and BMW 
(through the purchasing of Rover), as their decision to relaunch the brands, Maybach 
by the first, Rolls Royce by the second. One of these attempts was a rapid failure: 
BMW has been forced to sell Rover.  
These are some of the dilemmas facing firms today. They explain the need to 
have a new range of models and certain mergers and acquisitions. Some carmakers, 
unable to clearly evaluate the evolution in market structure, have decided to be 
present everywhere and to be prepared for any eventuality. However this type of 
policy seems more a reflection of despair than a reasoned strategy.  
The Daimler-Chrysler merger, increasingly seen as the former acquiring the 
latter, and Mitsubishi compromise“ obligates again the productive the desire to 
become a worldwide firm and to have models for all segments of the market: top-of-
the-line in each segment, the first market (mass oriented and hierarchized), the second 
market (innovative varied and variable models). Yet as one can easily observe, this 
involves cumulating all sorts of risks and challenges simultaneously. One must 
remember that up until now, no single firm has successfully and profitably 
implemented the cohabitation of two different profit strategies, particularly that of 
„innovation and flexibility“ with any other. 
Renault and Nissan will probably encounter similar problems. If the takeover of 
Dacia to produce a 5.000 euro model for an emerging market is coherent with 
Renault’s „innovation and flexibility“ strategy, this is not the case for its alliance with 
Nissan. Their respective profit strategies are for the moment incompatible. There are 
two solutions: they both adopt the same profit strategy, or, they invent an innovative 
path to render them compatible.  
The objective to respond to all kinds of demands also explains the succesive 
takeovers of Jaguar, Aston Martin, Volvo and Land Rover by Ford. Volkswagen 
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itself implemented a strict „volume and diversity“ strategy which commonalized the 
platforms of its four brands of classic sedans, and now want to make them all: luxury 
cars with Bentley, Lamborghini et Bugatti, recreational vehicles, heavy trucks with 
Scania. 
Among recent mergers and alliances, the alliance between General Motors and 
Fiat, potentially presents less difficulties. The two carmakers pursued the same profit 
strategy on different markets. They can commonalize with profit, the platforms of 
their models which share the same market segment. However they must do this 
quickly ; and with a coherent product policy at european level, applying it on a global 
scale.  
 Will it become necessary to invent a new „profit strategy“? Are there new 
opportunities for „reflexive production“? 
This hypothesis must be considered. If the coexistence of two markets should 
persist, differentiating themselves according to the world’s regions or even by 
country, it is possible that certain firms will attempt and succeed in rendering volume, 
diversity, innovation, and flexibility compatible, as General Motors rendered volume 
and diversity compatible in the 1920s and 1930s. However to achieve this, General 
Motors was required to invent a new automobile architecture, with commonalized 
platforms and car models differing on the „surface“, and the construction of new 
socio-productive principles: polyvalency and supplying. Are modular vehicles more 
than just a way of outsourcing a maximum quantity of work? Does this also signify a 
way to design innovative models thanks to different combinations of shared 
elements? Is there a new opportunity to relaunch the „reflexive production“ with, this 
time, the search of appropriate employment relationships? 
The will to survive is often at an incentive to explore new paths. However, we 
wish to stress the high level of intelligence and efforts needed to achieving this. 
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